Introduction
The political state of Turkey is considerably complicated. The country, 95% Muslim (Kinzer 1999), is grappling with a secular constitution and severe restrictions on religious practice in the public sphere. The situation, including military intervention in politics at multiple points, isolated terrorist attacks, secularist attempts to westernize and join the European Union, is hard to wade through, especially for foreign citizens not involved in international politics. This study attempts to explain how Americans view the Turkish political system and why in comparison to how Turkish citizens view their political system.
Background
First, it is very important to mention that there is not much of a perception of Turkey in America to begin with, and the country even be regarded as bring “without an image” (Sonmez and Sirakaya 2002). Students know its general location on a map due to history classes discussing Byzantium or the Ottoman Empire, but that essentially summarizes the extent of definite knowledge of the country that is held by much of the populace. In their study, Sonmez and Sirakaya found that only 2.7% of their test subjects had “higher degrees of familiarity with the country.” In addition, in terms of raw appeal value, they found that 41% of their test subjects found Turkey unappealing, 20% had no opinion, and 21% simply did not know how to answer (Sonmez and Sirakaya 2002). While Sonmez and Sirakaya were studying international tourism trends among Americans, it is important to note the level of ambivalence, or distaste, Americans routinely associate with Turkey.
One reason for Turkey’s lack of attention from Americans is the country’s lack of representation in the popular media. In Wayne Wanta’s study, Turkey ranked 24 (out of the 27 studied) in terms of the number of television news stories dedicated to it on major networks, with 25. Iraq was ranked first with 502 (Wanta, et al. 2004). Wanta argues that television coverage influences the amount viewers think about the subjects covered, so if a country such as Turkey is neglected by the news media it will be viewed as unimportant and remain disregarded by the populace (only 33% of the test subjects thought Turkey was vital to U.S. interests). In addition, the “National Temperature,” or overall attitude towards Turkey, ranked the country 16th out of 21, evoking a more negative connotation than Mexico, South Africa, Russia, China, India, and even Saudi Arabia. The only countries with worse connotations in the study were Pakistan, Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq (Wanta, et al. 2004). Therefore the perception of Turkey, as mentioned before, is generally either negative or ambivalent.
Of the little news coverage allotted to Turkey, much of it highlights political instability, violent military interventions, terrorist strikes, the conflict between the secularists and the Islamists, and the inability to achieve European Union recognition. In other words, exorbitant emphasis is placed on Turkey’s unappealing in the scant news coverage the country receives. Statements such as these are rife in the news: “Although more than 95 percent of Turks are Muslim, the country is a secular republic, and religious influence is severely restricted” (Kinzer 1999). Phrases like this emphasize the divide between religious and secular politics, making the government appear divided and inefficient. Quotes like this from Recep Tayyip Erdogan (the leader of the Justice and Development party, which is perceived to have a religious agenda, known by the acronym AKP) are overemphasized to resonate even more bluntly: “You cannot be secular and a Muslim at the same time…The world’s 1.5 Muslims are waiting for the Turkish people to rise up. We will rise up” (Quoted in Fisher, 2002). This statement masks what Erdogan actually did with political power, which was to continue the push to join the European Union as well as other secular policies, while pushing to relax religious restrictions, a much less inflammatory stance than his quote would imply. The main timbre of Turkish politics in American discourse is that of a brutal conflict between religious and anti-religious government. And it is indeed anti-religious government. Mohammed Ayoob describes the secular side as “secular fundamentalists” (Ayoob 2004). The perception of Turkey therefore is one of two bad associations. The Islamist politicians are viewed as militant, anti-western preachers, while their political opposition is seen as oppressive human rights violators.
This internal strife is one of the main reasons cited by the European Union for refusing Turkey’s participation, though Turks often voice the opinion that religious differences have kept them separated and that the European Union is unwilling to allow one of its largest members to be a majority Muslim nation. This perception has caused some bitterness among Turks, which has not gone unnoticed by the selective American media. In Aydin and Cakir’s study, most people feel that Turkey’s transition to democracy is not yet “sufficient or complete” (Aydin and Cakir, 2007), the opposite of Mohammed Ayoob’s assertion that Turkey is indeed a mature democracy ready for EU membership (Ayoob 2004). Largely, then, Turkey is seen as a transitioning and unstable Middle Eastern country, struggling between secular and Muslim identities.
The association with the Middle East also has both benefits and drawbacks for Turkey. The proximity to Islamic countries makes it a U.S. interest in the eyes of policy makers, who strongly advocate for the young democracy’s inclusion to the European Union as an influential force for the rest of the region (Ayoob 2004 “Turkey’s Multiple Paradoxes”). On the other hand, the association with other Middle East countries such as Iraq or Iran and their violent conditions has produced a perception of Turkey as a country caught up in fundamentalist Islamic tendencies. There is an afterimage, of sorts, a perception by association that is made when there is not much hard information easily available about the country. Since Turkey is mostly Muslim, it is viewed as a Muslim country and receives the emotional baggage that comes with that label. As Mohammed Ayoob says concisely, the three major untrue assumptions held with regards to political Islam are, “one, that Political Islam, like Islam itself, is monolithic; two, that political Islam is inherently violent; and, three, that the intermingling of religion and politics is unique to Islam. These assumptions are false” (Ayoob 2004, “Political Islam: Image and Reality”). While the assumptions may be false, they are still held by many, and the residues of assumptions are transplanted to Turkey because of its location and religious makeup. And, as stated before, when the country momentarily breaks free from this association through its secular state, it comes through as “secular fundamentalism,” also evoking negative feelings. There are all sorts of obvious examples of the misrepresenting of Muslims in American media and the arguments made in “The Roots of Muslim Rage” and “The Clash of Civilizations?” in media coverage, creating a picture Turkey desperately wants to separate itself from, but cannot manage to do so (Lewis 1990, and Huntington 1993). This sort of coverage reinforces the assumptions Ayoob laments. In the end of his argument in “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Bernard Lewis concludes that “Ultimately, the struggle of the fundamentalists is against two enemies, secularism and modernism,” portraying Mulsim communities as naturally against progress (Lewis 1990). This characterization makes it seem that Turkey’s attempts to secularize and modernize are doomed for failure because of the country’s Muslim composition, and the only reason it has survived so far are oppressive human rights abuses by the secularists.
Methods
The study was conducted by administering a four-question survey to 16 Turkish-speaking students who attend Bahcesehir University in Istanbul, Turkey. Those surveyed were almost entirely female, and in either their first or second year in the university. The qualitative survey was administered to the students individually. The survey had questions regarding perception of Turkish politics (What is Turkey’s relationship to the European Union? What is the role of Religion in Turkish Politics? Describe the Turkish Political System in 3 words) as well as a personal question regarding the human effect of Turkish politics (In what specific ways have Turkish laws of policies affected you personally?). The questions were in written in English.
Results
The surveys were designed to produce qualitative data due to the narrow pool of participants and their demographical similarities. The easiest question to quantify into numerical data was, “Describe the Turkish political system in three words.” The answers were divided into either positive or negative attitudes towards Turkish politics, leaving out neutral responses such as indeterminable “Secular,” “Religious,” or “Democratic.” A positive word might be “Free,” while a negative word might be “Unsteady.” There were a total of 19 negative response words and 6 positive response words. For every positive word mentioned about the Turkish political system there were three disparaging or dissatisfied words. There were a total of 47 words collected in this question (one respondent only provided two words). The most popular common words were “Democracy,” “Secular,” “Non-secular,” “Lies,” or their synonyms.
14 of the respondents chose to answer the question, “What is Turkey’s relationship to the European Union? Why?” The answers were divided into four categories: Yearning for EU, Rejection of EU, Bad Relationship, and Symbiotic Relationship. The common response expressed a yearning for Turkey to be in the EU, often including frustration because of their country’s alienation. 7 responses fit this category, with phrases such as, “It will be good to be a member but they don’t think we can be a member of [the] EU.” There were 2 instances of rejection of the EU, such as this example: “Turkey’s politicians do whatever the EU says because these politicians don’t care about [the] country’s goods,” implying that adhering to European Union politics would have a negative impact on Turkey. 2 respondents referred to the relationship bluntly as “bad.” The final 3 respondents claimed, “Turkey and [the] EU both need each other.” 2 of these responses said the reason for this was because Turkey is a young country whereas Europe is older. The third respondent’s reasoning was that Turkey is a Muslim country and can make a “bridge” to other Islamic countries.
16 respondents answered the question, “What is the role of religion in Turkish politics?” 10 of these responses recognized that religion plays a major role in Turkish politics, while only 2 claimed that Turkey is a completely secular country (as written by one blunt respondent, “We have secularism in Turkey and you know in secularism religion doesn’t play a role in politics”). The remaining four recognized the Turkish public push for secularism but also the prevalence of religion in the public sphere, as if to say Turkey is both religious and secular at the same time, or trying to find a balance between these two identities. One respondent explained the reason for this paradox: “In Turkey, religion plays an important role like [in] all politics. But [Christianity] is [an] old religion and debates are over, almost, but Islam is not Christian, we are still debate some issues.” Two responses referred to religion directly as a method politicians use to gain votes and trick the public. The theme of trickery ran through most of the surveys in one question or another. As one respondent said, “CHP, AKP have a role [in] religion. People in Turkey are so religious and stupid. Politicians are tricky and people are not clever enough to understand it.” The CHP is the strongest political party in opposition to the AKP and was created by Turkey’s founder and national hero, Ataturk. The CHP is characterized by a push towards secularism, implementing measures such as the famous headscarf ban, so it is surprising that the respondent would assert that this party too has a role in religious politics.
Only 12 respondents chose to answer the question, “In what specific ways have Turkish laws or policies affected you personally?” 7 of these responses were in the general form of, “They don’t affect me.” This answer is surprising, especially from a survey pool that had largely negative attitudes towards the Turkish government. It can be posited that the language difference between the survey and the respondents affected the data here. 3 of the other responses expressed an amount of anger, and the remaining 2 were not specific.
Discussion
First it must be noted that, like citizens in our American, those surveyed here have different levels of knowledge of current events. One cannot surmise how much is true about Turkish politics in itself from the statements from its citizens the same way Americans have different levels of understanding how our governmental system functions.
It is also important to discuss once again the particular group of people surveyed in this study. Through personal inquiry it is evident that Bahcesehir is a liberal representation of Istanbul and Turkey. Therefore one can predict that the recent victories of the religious AKP in elections would upset those surveyed, even before passing out the surveys. Those surveyed do not represent a larger Turkish community. In fact, because women’s rights in religious politics is such a volatile matter, this study cannot even be said to represent university students in Istanbul. At best, this study can make vague generalizations about the perception of Turkish politics in the eyes of 18-20 year old university students in Istanbul.
Those surveyed showed a general amount of disdain for the political society in which they lived. Many emphasized the contradictions between the governing AKP, seeing it to be using religious tools while claiming that Turkey is a secular republic. In this way, the internal perception of Turkish politics is the same as American perspectives on Turkish politics, in that each side sees that Turkey is battling between its religious and its secular sides. Those surveyed, however, have a personal stake in local politics and are angered or disillusioned by the right-wing direction the government seems to be headed in. Even if the majority of those surveyed claimed to not be affected by specific policies, those who long for a truly secular society expressed a potent dissatisfaction toward their political system. Coupled with the desire to enter the European union, a slightly more divisive issue, those surveyed had plenty to be unhappy with. It could be argued, then, that Turkish perceptions of Turkish politics are similar to American perceptions of American politics in that both are generally negative.
It is true that there is a similar perception of Turkish politics among Americans and among Turks with regards to the opposition between religion and secularization. However, what we see in the Turkish perspective that we don’t in America so much is the desire to westernize and modernize. 5 respondents wrote that an improvement to the government would be better education, especially in the technological sphere, expressing am urge to develop. This desire is clearly a push to match the modernity of other western countries, perhaps culminating in acceptance into the European Union. The relationship to the EU is still a hotly debated issue in Turkey, but this study seems to show a general sentiment that western values and western modernity are good things for the country.
Personal Reflections
I was lucky enough to visit Istanbul during the week before local elections. There were flags strung across every street, faces plastered upon every billboard, and trucks blasting party slogans parading up and down the city. Politics was on everyone’s mind, and it was insufferably inescapable. Of course, this forced political fervor was something I was supremely interested in, probably to the point of annoying my Turkish friends.
When I would talk to people about the AKP, they would often compare the party’s success to George Bush’s. In the minds of my friends there was no particular allure of the party save for the religion aspect, which was not alluring to my friends in the slightest. So, like Bush, it came as a total surprise to them that the AKP was elected for a second term. When I asked why the CHP was so weak, the common response was that the CHP lacked a solid leadership. Again, very like American politics. If John Kerry was a stronger opponent we may have only seen Bush for a single term, but the Democratic Party was having trouble rebuilding its image after 9/11.
My Turkish friends were also very surprised that America does not have mandatory voting, just as I was surprised to discover that Turkey did. My friends were shocked at how low voter turnout is in the United States. I’ve never been able to explain the reason for that trend. Like my friends, I don’t understand why one would choose not to vote.
After returning to America I have been keeping up a correspondence with my Turkish friends using online networking websites. I asked a few of them to tell me what happens on the election (true to my research-informed predictions, the American press had nothing to say about local Turkish elections). All my friends were able to predict, solemnly, what the outcome would be. On March 29, election day, I watched election results come in on a Turkish site one of my friends sent me. We watched together despite being on opposite sides of the world. Apparently the AKP’s 34% was considerably less than their majorities before. This was not enough to cheer my friend up. CHP, the second most popular choice, ended with 23%.
My Turkish friends had a fairly sizable knowledge of American politics in addition to their own. Some even knew about the California proposition banning gay marriage. Obama, as expected, was severely popular among just about everyone I talked with. One of my friends said enthusiastically, “Obama’s a Muslim, right?” She was shocked to hear that he would have lost the election if that were indeed the case. She had read it in the news “all over the place,” and even knew that his father came from a rare ethnic group in Africa. She had read her stuff, but still got the facts wrong. I wish I had asked more people if they had the same misconception. This woman was not uninformed, I can say for certainty, regarding other conversations I had with her.
In addition to being very interested to learn about American politics regarding Turkey from us, they were excited to teach us anything we wanted to know about Turkey’s culture and government. I was asked a few times what Americans (and Obama) thinks about Turkey. My research for the literature review came in handy here. I was also often told straight out that if I had any questions regarding anything Turkish that I should simply ask. In this way I learned about the more socialist control the government has on services. For example, the concept of private and public university is reversed from what Americans normally think. Public universities are the best ones in Turkey because you can only go to those with the best test scores. Private universities are generally where students who do poorly on the test can pay their way. In the case of Bahcesehir, the money to fund the school came from a soccer team. The government funding of public schools in Turkey is much more complete than it is in America.
Unlike anything I ever expected to see, religious affiliation is printed on each person’s identification cards. It was the first time I looked at a friend’s ID card without laughing at the picture first.
I would be inclined to say that the people I met were politically active, but I think in reality they were simply politically different and generally curious. Like me, actually. That may be why we were able to get along so well during my stay. We were all thirsty for knowledge, and we were eager to drink together.
References
Mohammed Ayoob, “Turkey’s Multiple Paradoxes,” Orbis, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Elsevier Limited, Summer 2004, pp. 451-463.
Mohammed Ayoob, “Political Islam: Image and Reality,” World Policy Journal, Fall 2004, pp. 1-14.
Ian Fisher, “Party With Islamic Roots Likely to Win Turkish Vote,” The New York Times, October 31, 2002.
Stephen Kinzer, “Car-Bombing Killing in Turkey Revives Battle Over Islamic Politics,” The New York Times, November 11, 1999.
Wayne Wanta, Guy Golan, and Cheolhan Lee, “Agenda Setting and International News: Media Influence on Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations,” Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, Summer 2004, pp. 364-377.
Sevil Sonmez and Ercan Sirakaya, “A Distorted Destination Image? The Case of Turkey,” Journal of Travel Research, November 2002, pp. 185-196.
Senem Aydin and Rusen Cakir, “Political Islam in Turkey,” Center for European Policy Studies, 2007, pp. 1-13
Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why so Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not be Easily Molified,” Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, pp. 47-60.
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.
